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Abstract
This paper analyzes the influence of domestic political considerations by disputing governments on
the WTO enforcement outcome, following a violation ruling against the defendant. Since a different
mix of import or export sectors in the disputing countries will benefit from the alternative enforcement
outcomes – compliance, compensation, retaliation, and the status quo, they become competing forces
that steer the strategic interactions between the disputing governments. This paper first studies the
complainant’s retaliation capacity and strategy in formulating the retaliation list, and then examines
the scope of settlement possibilities between the disputing parties. The results of the paper provide a
synopsis of the disputing governments’ political payoffs under the alternative enforcement scenarios and
the conditions that determine the outcome of the implementation.
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Consult before you legislate;/ Negotiate before you litigate;/ Compensate before you retaliate;/
And comply–at any rate. — European Commissioner for Trade, Pascal Lamy
1. INTRODUCTION
The World Trade Organization (WTO) dispute settlement procedure (DSP) has seen quite a successful
track record of compliance, where a defendant government found in violation of a WTO rule implements
the panel/appellate body’s recommendations within a reasonable period of time. Nonetheless, the record
is overshadowed by a couple of noncompliance cases, where the defendant government does not correct the
violations and the complainant responds by seeking authorization from the WTO to suspend application to
the scoﬄaw government of concessions or other obligations. The cases where the complainant has actually
carried out the retaliation are the famous disputes of beef hormones and bananas against the European
Communities (EC).1 Meanwhile, some cases with a “violation” ruling have been resolved through an in-
termediate enforcement scheme, compensation. In this arrangement, the losing defendant compensates the
complainant by conceding at other sectors while maintains the WTO-illegal trade measure. Table 1 provides
a breakdown of the WTO disputes in terms of their procedural and enforcement outcomes.
Although compliance is the preferred outcome in the WTO legal framework, and compensation and
retaliation are deemed only temporary measures intended to induce compliance, compliance is not always
easy and forthcoming. Some trade-related policies proved politically difficult to be dismantled, such as the
EC regulation of beef hormones and the United States tax treatment for Foreign Sales Corporations (FSC).2
This is in spite of the foreseeable retaliation from the complaining party, and its likely impacts on the
defendant’s export sectors and the political costs that will be borne by the defendant government. On the
other hand, since the complainant government enjoys wide latitude in determining the hit list of retaliation,
this is likely to mobilize both the import and export interests at the complainant country and to work in
conflicting directions to influence the making of the retaliation list.3 This paper attempts to develop an
economic framework to analyze the political forces that propel or impede the possibility of compliance. In
particular, the paper will address the following questions. Given the political and economic environments of
the disputing parties, will we see the desired result of compliance in a particular dispute? If not, how likely
relatively are the alternative arrangements of compensation and retaliation? If retaliation is called upon,
what are the sectors that will be targeted?
1WTO DS26, European Communities: Measures concerning meat and meat products (hormones) (brought by US): 31
January 1996; WTO DS27, European Communities: Regime for the importation, sale and distribution of bananas (brought
by Ecuador, Guatemala, Honduras, Mexico, US): 12 February 1996; WTO DS48, European Communities: Measures affecting
meat and meat products (hormones) (brought by Canada): 8 July 1996.
2WTO DS108, United States: Tax treatment for Foreign Sales Corporations (brought by EC): 28 November 1997.
3See Charnovitz (2001) for a similar comment.
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This paper portrays the disputing parties as democratic governments which face domestic political con-
straints, as well as the rules of enforcement laid down by the WTO dispute procedure. They are mindful of
the impacts of various enforcement outcomes – compliance, compensation, retaliation, and the status quo
– on industry interests as well as on aggregate welfare, and choose strategies that best serve their political
interests. The model of the paper characterizes the specific rules of enforcement stipulated by the WTO and
carried out by countries in practice, in an attempt to reflect the realistic incentives and constraints countries
face under the WTO enforcement mechanism. The paper also captures the asymmetric enforcement power
problem common in bilateral trading relationships. This is done by constructing a three-country trading
system with multiple sectors. Enforcement failures arise when the complainant has no retaliation capacity to
induce compliance or some form of compensation from the defendant. As the WTO enforcement is carried
out bilaterally, enforcement failure under the system is prone to happen when country sizes differ a lot and
when trade flows among countries are very asymmetric.
Several implications follow from the analysis in this paper. First, the likelihood that compliance will
emerge as a political equilibrium outcome depends on the relative political power of the defendant’s sectors
which have benefited from the existing illegal trade policy, versus that of his export sectors which will be the
targets of retaliation. The determination of the hit list of retaliation by the complainant, in turn, depends
on the complainant’s retaliation capacity. The complainant will, within his retaliation capacity and the
level authorized by the WTO, target the defendant’s export sectors which has the greatest political clout,
if compliance is foreseeable with the threat of this list. If not, the retaliation list will instead consist of the
complainant’s import sectors such that the list maximizes the complainant government’s domestic political
gain relative to the status quo. When compliance outcome is not likely, but the complainant has some
retaliation capacity, it is possible to avoid retaliation by identifying some mutually agreeable compensation
scheme which makes both governments better off. The possibility of such settlement depends on the relative
political strength of the defendant’s import sectors which will lose from the compensation scheme versus
that of his export sectors which will lose from retaliation, and on the relative political strength of the
complainant’s export sectors which will benefit from the compensation scheme versus that of his import
sectors which will benefit from retaliation.
By focusing on the strategic interaction of politically-motivated governments at the enforcement stage of
the WTO dispute procedure, the paper has abstracted from the immediate question of countries’ incentives to
initiate the WTO dispute procedure in the first place and disputants’ strategic interactions during the entire
dispute process. These subjects are studied in Bu¨tler and Hauser (2000) and Chang (2002). Another question
that attracts a major proportion of research interests in the literature concerns the role of the WTO dispute
procedure in strengthening or weakening the pace of multilateral trade liberalization. Contributions to this
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literature include Hungerford (1991), Kovenoch and Thursby (1993), Ludema (2001), and Maggi (1999).
An insightful review of this literature is given in Staiger (1995). This literature regards the international
trade agreements as cooperative efforts by the world trading partners to simultaneously reduce unilateral
trade restrictions so as to remove the externality that countries’ trade policies may inflict on one another.
The Pareto-superior equilibrium of trade policy cooperation is sustained by the threat of future trade wars
following any country’s deviation from the agreed-upon tariff and subsidy ceilings. In this literature, the
dispute procedure usually plays a minimal role as a mechanism of information dissemination, a forum of
communication, or an administrator of retaliation, with no inherent enforcement power.4 The enforcement
power comes ultimately from the threat of countries’ reverting to the state of multilateral trade wars. This
view of the previous literature is useful in understanding the post SecondWorldWar experience of multilateral
trade liberalization, whereby nations strive to cooperate in trade policies in order to avoid the vicious circle
of trade wars in the 1920s–30s. However, it is less helpful in explaining the facts that nations still deviate
from their tariff and subsidy commitments repeatedly, that retaliation is an infrequent incidence, and that
the world trading system still operates quite smoothly without plunging into an overall trade war despite
recurring deviations.5 To put the economic framework of the current paper into perspective, the author
suggests an alternative view about the WTO dispute settlement procedure to what has been proposed by the
previous literature. The WTO dispute settlement procedure may be considered as performing the role as a re-
balancing mechanism of bilateral concessions and obligations between countries during the intervals between
periodic multilateral trade negotiations. It provides a speedy bilateral re-alignment of trade concessions and
obligations in response to frequent changes in the political and economic environments of trading nations,
before the next round of multilateral negotiations take place. To prevent the re-balancing of trade concessions
from developing into overall trade wars, withdrawals of concessions are carefully meted out by the WTO
dispute procedure, and since the threatened retaliation or re-balancing of trade concession is carried out
bilaterally, enforcement failures do occur. However, the order of the overall trading system is maintained
with the threat of its complete breakdown, as is highlighted by the previous literature.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 first lays out the political and economic framework
of the trading world. In Section 3, the paper then analyzes the complainant’s retaliation capacity and strategy
in formulating the retaliation list. Section 4 examines the settlement possibilities between the disputing
parties and the Pareto optimal ones among them. Section 5 then examines the relationship between the
equilibrium enforcement outcome and the structure of the disputing governments’ political payoffs under
4Kovenoch and Thursby (1993) is an exception by proposing the notion that countries feel a sense of “international obligation”
to conform to the multilateral trade agreements, which implies an extra cost to violate the agreements in addition to the threat
of trade wars.
5See Ethier (2001) for similar comments.
4
alternative enforcement scenarios. The results are summarized in Propositions 1 to 4. Concluding remarks
are collected in Section 6.
2. THE BASIC FRAMEWORK
I consider a world with three countries: the defendant, the complainant, and the rest of the world. The
economies of the defendant and the complainant are potentially large such that trade policies of one country
may affect the welfare of another country.6 The countries in the world are assumed to share similar economic
and political structures a` la Grossman and Helpman (1994, 1995a,b), whose basic framework is summarized
in the appendix.
Let (τd, τ c, τw) denote the trade policies that the defendant, the complainant, and the rest of the world
use respectively. In particular, the trade policy vector τ j of country j contains the trade taxes or subsidies
in all sectors (τ j1 , . . . , τ
j
n) for j = {d, c, w}. If sector i in country j is an import sector, τ
j
i corresponds to one
plus the ad valorem tariff rate; if it is an export sector, τ ji corresponds to one plus the export subsidy rate.
Suppose p∗i is the prevailing international price of good i. Then the domestic price of good i in country j
is pji = τ
j
i p
∗
i . Let M
j
i (p
j
i ) denote the import demand for good i by country j given the domestic price p
j
i .
A negative M ji indicates that country j is an export supplier of good i. In some sectors, one or both of
the defendant and complainant countries may be importing from the other countries, while in some other
sectors, both countries may be exporting to the rest of world. Since the world trade must balance in every
sector given the trade policies used by the countries, the international price of good i at the equilibrium
satisfies:
Mdi (τ
d
i · p
∗
i ) +M
c
i (τ
c
i · p
∗
i ) +M
w
i (τ
w
i · p
∗
i ) = 0 (1)
for i = 1, . . . , n. Therefore, equation (1) defines the equilibrium international price of good i as a function of
countries’ trade policies in sector i: p∗i = p
∗
i (τ
d
i , τ
c
i , τ
w
i ) for i = 1, . . . , n. It is straightforward to verify that
dp∗i
dτ ji
=
−
dMji
dpji
p∗i
dMdi
dpdi
τdi +
dMci
dpci
τ ci +
dMwi
dpwi
τwi
< 0, (2)
for j = {d, c, w} and i = 1, . . . , n, where I have used the regularity assumption that
dMji
dpji
< 0 and the positive
constraint that τ ji > 0 for j = {d, c, w} and i = 1, . . . , n. Equation (2) states that other things being equal,
an increase in the import tariff (or export subsidy) for a sector by any of the countries will depress the
6If the defendant is a small country, its trade policies has no effect on the world prices and on the complainant’s welfare.
This can not explain the complainant’s action to file the dispute in the first place.
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equilibrium international price in the sector. Furthermore, it can be shown that
dpji
dτki
= τ ji
dp∗i
dτki
+ p∗i
dτ ji
dτki
=


−
dMki
dpk
i
τji
dMd
i
dpd
i
τdi +
dMc
i
dpc
i
τci +
dMw
i
dpw
i
τwi
p∗i + p
∗
i > 0 if j = k
−
dMki
dpk
i
τji
dMd
i
dpd
i
τdi +
dMc
i
dpc
i
τci +
dMw
i
dpw
i
τwi
p∗i < 0 if j 6= k
(3)
for j, k = {d, c, w}, and i = 1, . . . , n. Hence, other things being equal, a country, by increasing the import
protection (or export subsidy) for a sector, will raise the domestic price of the good at home but will lower
the domestic price of the good in other countries through the decrease in the equilibrium international price.
As described in the appendix, the profit Πji of sector i in country j increases with the domestic price of
the same sector pji . Therefore,
dΠji
dτki
=
dΠji
dpji
dpji
dτki


> 0 if j = k
< 0 if j 6= k,
(4)
i.e. the profit in sector i increases with the domestic protection in the same sector, but decreases with
the protection overseas in the same sector. Thus, the objective of interest groups is to influence the local
government to increase protection for the sector they represent, while at the same time to influence the local
government to pressure his trading partners to lower their protection in the same sector.
On the other hand, the effect of protection on the aggregate welfare of the local country or its trading
partners is less clear cut. A country’s aggregate welfare depends on the equilibrium international prices, as
well as the domestic prices. Given the economic structure described in the appendix, it can be shown that
dW j
dτki
= −M ji
dp∗i
dτki
+ (pji − p
∗
i )
dM ji
dτki
, (5)
where W j is the aggregate welfare of country j, which includes total labor income, total profits, total trade
tax revenues net of subsidy expenditures, and aggregate consumer surplus.7 The first term in equation (5)
can be interpreted as the terms of trade (TOT) effect on country j of the trade policy change in country k,
and the second term the effect of this change on the magnitude of deadweight loss (DWL) incurred by country
j due to its own existing trade policy. A positive (negative) first term indicates a TOT gain (loss), while a
7M
j
i > 0 if country j is an importer of good i, and M
j
i < 0 if country j is an exporter of good i;
dp∗i
dτk
i
< 0 as shown in
equation (2); (pji − p
∗
i ) > 0 if there is an import tariff (export subsidy), and (p
j
i − p
∗
i ) < 0 if there is an import subsidy (export
tax);
dM
j
i
dτk
i
=
dM
j
i
dp
j
i
dp
j
i
dτk
i
< 0 if j = k, and
dM
j
i
dτk
i
> 0 if j 6= k.
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positive (negative) second term indicates an improvement (worsening) in the country’s deadweight loss. For
example, an increase in import tariff by country k on good i has a negative TOT effect on a country that
exports the good, but has a positive effect on the exporting country’s deadweight loss if an export subsidy
is originally in place. The original export subsidy expands the exporting country’s trade artificially, so the
decrease in the TOT, which brings about lower exports, actually works to reduce the exporting country’s
deadweight loss due to excess trade. Thus, an increase in the import tariff by an importing country has a
possibly positive or negative welfare effect on a country that exports the good, depending on the relative
strength of TOT loss and the improvement in DWL.
Overall, depending on the initial protection structure of the countries, the effects of one country’s trade
policy change can have different implications on the other countries’ aggregate welfare. We can study the
effects under all possible scenarios, given equation (5). However, since import subsidy or export tax is rarely
in use, I choose to focus on the case where import tariff and export subsidy are the only instruments used by
countries. In this case, other things being equal, a country, by increasing the import tariff of one sector, has
a possibly positive or negative welfare effect on the country itself and on the countries that export the good,
but will benefit any other country that imports the good. On the other hand, an increase in export subsidy
will have a negative welfare effect on the local country, a positive welfare effect on the countries that import
the good, and a possibly positive or negative welfare effect on any other country that exports the good.
Let W ji denote the proportion of aggregate welfare in country j that is attributable to sector i (the profit
of sector i, the tariff revenue or subsidy expenditure of sector i, and the consumer surplus derived from good
i). Then given the political objective function of the government described in the appendix, the political clout
of sector i in country j is Πji + a
jW ji , which includes government j’s concern for the welfare of the domestic
interest group representing sector i and the aggregate welfare attributable to sector i. The parameter aj
captures government j’s relative attention to aggregate welfare versus special interests. Governments each
choose actions that maximize their political welfare Gj =
∑n
i=1Π
j
i + a
j
∑n
i=1W
j
i , for j = {d, c, w}, subject
to any international rules and constraints.
I now examine the political incentives the governments face under the WTO enforcement mechanism. The
mechanism can be characterized as follows. Initially, countries agree to a set of tariff/subsidy commitments
after the latest round of trade negotiation. The defendant later deviates and exceeds the tariff/subsidy
bindings in some sector. The breach is challenged by the complainant and later ruled by the WTO to be in
violation of the WTO agreements. The complainant may retaliate against the defendant if the latter fails to
comply or compensate. The retaliatory action if taken by the complainant is discriminatory in nature and
is usually carried out in practice by imposing 100% import tariffs on selected products from the defendant.
To simplify analysis, I will focus on the case where the defendant’s violation is non-discriminatory in nature
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and does not target a particular trading partner. However, for some reason not investigated in this paper,
this violation is challenged by the complainant alone. I will also assume that the effect of imposing a 100%
retaliatory tariff by the complainant is equivalent to that of a prohibitive tariff. Therefore, the defendant’s
exports affected by the tariff are excluded from the complainant’s market. This approximation is close to
what countries have in mind in practice when they undertake such retaliatory action. As documented by
Charnovitz (2001), both the United States and Canada in the Hormone case retaliated against the EC using
100% ad valorem tariffs, with an intention for them to be prohibitive.
Suppose under some initial political and economic structure, the countries negotiate and agree to im-
plement the MFN trade policies (τdi,l, τ
c
i,l, τ
w
i,l) for i = 1, . . . , n. Suppose some changes occur later to the
world’s political and economic structure which prompt the defendant government to defy the agreement
and raise protection for some sector(s). Let (τdi,q, τ
c
i,l, τ
w
i,l) for i = 1, . . . , n denote the new MFN protection
structure after the defendant breaks the rules, and before the other countries take any action in response
to the defendant’s violation. Let the current political and economic structure of the world be summa-
rized by (aj ,Πji (·),M
j
i (·),W
j
i (·)) for j = {d, c, w}. Along with the trade policies in use, this determines
the prevailing world and domestic prices: p∗i,q and p
j
i,q for j = {d, c, w} and i = 1, . . . , n. The prevail-
ing world price p∗i,q satisfies: M
d
i (p
d
i,q) +M
c
i (p
c
i,q) +M
w
i (p
w
i,q) = 0 for i = 1, . . . , n, where p
d
i,q = τ
d
i,q p
∗
i,q,
pci,q = τ
c
i,l p
∗
i,q and p
w
i,q = τ
w
i,l p
∗
i,q. The government’s political welfare under this state is (G
d
q , G
c
q, G
w
q ), where
Gjq =
∑n
i=1Π
j
i (p
j
i,q) +
∑n
i=1W
j
i (p
j
i,q , p
∗
i,q). I will refer to this state as the status quo.
Afterwards, suppose the complainant successfully challenges the defendant’s new trade policy and the
WTO recommends the latter to bring his policy into conformity with the agreement. The defendant may
comply, try to settle with the complainant, or else face the likelihood of retaliation from the complainant.
If the defendant complies, the old protection structure of the world (τdi,l, τ
c
i,l, τ
w
i,l) reapplies. Let p
∗
i,l and p
j
i,l,
for j = {d, c, w} and i = 1, . . . , n, denote the would-be prevailing world and domestic prices if the defendant
complies under the current political and economic structure (aj ,Πji (·),M
j
i (·),W
j
i (·)). Then, the world price
p∗i,l satisfies: M
d
i (p
d
i,l) +M
c
i (p
c
i,l) +M
w
i (p
w
i,l) = 0 for i = 1, . . . , n, where p
d
i,l = τ
d
i,l p
∗
i,l, p
c
i,l = τ
c
i,l p
∗
i,l and
pwi,l = τ
w
i,l p
∗
i,l. The government’s political welfare under this state, if the defendant complies, is (G
d
l , G
c
l , G
w
l ),
where Gjl =
∑n
i=1Π
j
i (p
j
i,l) +
∑n
i=1W
j
i (p
j
i,l , p
∗
i,l).
On the other hand, if the defendant fails to comply or to settle with the complainant, the complainant
may retaliate with the WTO’s authorization up to the level determined as appropriate by the WTO. I will
investigate the complainant’s decision in choosing the list of sectors to retaliate in a moment in Section 3.
But first of all, I characterize the equilibrium world and domestic price that will emerge in a sector if the
sector is on the list, and the impact of this on the government’s political welfare. Suppose sector i is on
the retaliation list, and the complainant levies a 100% import tariff (in lieu of any existing tariff) on the
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defendant’s exports in sector i. Assume this rate of tariff is close to a prohibitive tariff. The equilibrium
price that will arise depends on the structure of bilateral trade flows. First of all, if the complainant imports
nothing from the defendant in sector i, the complainant can not retaliate against the defendant in this
sector. By default, such sectors will not be on the list. Secondly, if the defendant is the sole exporter of
good i, the complainant’s retaliation will divert the defendant’s exports toward the rest of the world, and
the complainant has to satisfy his domestic demand by his available domestic supply. The equilibrium world
price p∗i,r of good i if it is on the retaliation list is determined by:
Mdi (p
d
i,r) +M
w
i (p
w
i,r) = 0,
where pdi,r = τ
d
i,q p
∗
i,r and p
w
i,r = τ
w
i,l p
∗
i,r. The domestic price of good i in the complainant country is determined
by: M ci (p
c
i,r) = 0. Thirdly, if the complainant is the sole importer of good i, the complainant will now import
exclusively from the rest of the world and the defendant has to absorb all of his excess supply at home. In
this case, the equilibrium world price p∗i,r of good i if it is on the retaliation list is determined by:
M ci (p
c
i,r) +M
w
i (p
w
i,r) = 0,
where pci,r = τ
c
i,l p
∗
i,r and p
w
i,r = τ
w
i,l p
∗
i,r. The domestic price of good i in the defendant country is determined
by: Mdi (p
d
i,r) = 0. In either case whether the defendant is the sole exporter or the complainant is the sole
importer, if sector i is on the retaliation list, the domestic price of good i will increase in the complainant
country and decrease in the defendant country, compared to the status quo, i.e. pci,r > p
c
i,q and p
d
i,r < p
d
i,q.
Given the effects on domestic prices, it follows that if good i is on the retaliation list, the impacts on the
profits of sector i in the disputing countries are:
4Πci ≡ Π
c
i,r −Π
c
i,q > 0,
4Πdi ≡ Π
d
i,r −Π
d
i,q < 0.
Thus, the interest group representing sector i in the complainant country will benefit from the retaliation
act, while the interest group of the corresponding sector in the defendant country will suffer. Next, I turn to
the effects of retaliation on the disputing countries’ aggregate welfare. Given the same import tariff against
the rest of the world as before, a rise in the domestic price at the complainant country as a result of the
retaliation will lower its tariff revenue and increase its deadweight loss. Thus, the retaliation has a negative
impact on the aggregate welfare of the complainant country. Furthermore, the retaliation will in general have
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a negative impact on the aggregate welfare of the defendant country, unless the defendant’s original export
subsidy in sector i is highly distorting such that trade with the current subsidy is worse than without trade.
In this case, restricting its exports by the complainant’s retaliation actually lessens its aggregate welfare loss.
Therefore,
4W ci ≡W
c
i,r −W
c
i,q < 0,
4W di ≡W
d
i,r −W
d
i,q Q 0.
Despite the possibly beneficial effect of retaliation on the aggregate welfare of the defendant country, I will
argue that the retaliation in any given sector can not make the defendant government better off compared
to the status quo, in terms of its political welfare Πdi + a
dW di . This is because it is always possible for the
defendant government to replicate the would-be domestic price under retaliation pdi,r by reducing its existing
export policy τdi,q. The act would be WTO-consistent and would render the interest group i as well off as
under retaliation, while it would replicate or improve on the aggregate welfare under retaliation. The fact
that the defendant government does not do so implies that the existing trade policy makes him better off
than under retaliation. In summary, the retaliation in sector i will have a negative impact on the defendant
government in terms of its political welfare. On the other hand, retaliation in sector i has a possibly positive
or negative impact on the complainant government’s political welfare, depending on the relative strength of
the resulting welfare loss and the profit gain. Therefore,
4Πci + a
c4W ci R 0,
4Πdi + a
d4W di < 0.
3. THE RETALIATION LIST
In the event that the defendant country fails to comply within the determined reasonable period of time
or to reach a mutually satisfactory arrangement with the complainant, the complainant country may seek
authorization from the WTO to retaliate. The Dispute Settlement Understanding (DSU) of the WTO
stipulates that the level of retaliation be equivalent to the level of nullification or impairment suffered by
the complainant. It is however somewhat hazy what the exact economic criterion should be used to measure
the level of nullification or impairment and the level of retaliation. In practice, the determination of such
level has been based on the amount of trade values restricted by an import-restricting measure,8 or the total
8The EC hormone case (WT/DS26/ARB; WT/DS48/ARB) and banana case (WT/DS27/ARB; WT/DS27/ARB/ECU).
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amount of subsidy granted by an export-assisting policy.9 Once the level of nullification or impairment is
determined by arbitration, the retaliation by the complainant country usually takes the form of imposing a
100% ad valorem tariff, in lieu of any existing tariffs, on selected imports from the defendant country with
a total trade value equal to the determined level of nullification. It is far from clear that these operational
methodologies will result in a balancing welfare effect on the disputing parties; in fact, most likely they
will not, as discussed in Anderson (2002). However, I will take these practiced methodologies as given, and
investigate the complainant’s strategy in selecting the retaliation list and the ensuing strategic interactions
between the parties.
Suppose the level of nullification or impairment is determined by WTO arbitration to be T . The com-
plainant may select imports from the defendant that sum up to T and impose a 100% ad valorem tariff
on them. Therefore, T is the maximum trade value authorized for retaliation. Let R represent the list of
sectors or goods selected for retaliation by the complainant. Then the complainant’s constraint of retaliation
is
∫
i∈R
Ti di ≤ T , where Ti is the trade value of imports from the defendant in sector i.
Given the authorized level T , the complainant has two potential strategies in selecting the retaliation
list. The first strategy is to select the list such that the list maximizes his domestic political gain, through
granting new protection to the selected industries. I call this list the politically optimal retaliation list A
or RA(T ). The second strategy is to select the list such that the list maximizes the political cost of the
defendant government, which incurs loss of political support from the interest groups (as well as likely loss
of aggregate welfare) in the selected sectors facing increased restrictions on their exports. I call this second
list the politically optimal retaliation list B or RB(T ).
To maximize domestic political gain given the authorized retaliation level T , it proves convenient to order
the sectors such that i ∈ [0, n] and gi = (4Π
c
i + a
c4W ci )/Ti decreases with i, where 4Π
c
i = Π
c
i,r − Π
c
i,q
and 4W ci = W
c
i,r −W
c
i,q. Note that in sectors where the complainant imports nothing from the defendant,
retaliation in terms of import restriction is not possible. It follows that in these sectors, Πci,r = Π
c
i,q,
W ci,r = W
c
i,q, and gi = 0. Let i0 denote the lowest index such that gi = 0. Thus, gi > 0 for i ∈ [0, i0] and
gi ≤ 0 for i ∈ [i0, n]. In addition, define iˆ such that
∫ iˆ
0
Ti di = T .
Definition 1 The politically optimal retaliation list RA(T ), which maximizes the complainant government’s
political gain of retaliation given the WTO-authorized level T , is the set of sectors i such that i ∈ [0,min(i0, iˆ)].
Note that the country’s retaliation capacity is T 0 ≡
∫ i0
0
Ti di, the total trade value of imports from
the defendant in the set of sectors i such that gi > 0. If it so happens that i0 < iˆ, then the country’s
retaliation capacity falls short of the full authorized level T . A complainant country that imports a lot
9The US FSC case (WT/DS108/ARB) and the Brazil aircraft case (WT/DS46/ARB).
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from the defendant country has potentially higher retaliation capacity. However, an import sector does
not automatically qualify as a potential sector to impose retaliation. Only the import sectors where the
complainant government gains from the retaliation (gi > 0) will be the candidates for the retaliation list.
Therefore, if a complainant country can impose the discriminatory retaliatory tariffs on more of the imports
from the defendant without suffering large aggregate welfare loss, the larger is the country’s retaliation
capacity. In the case that i0 > iˆ, the complainant country has larger retaliation capacity than is authorized
to exercise by the WTO; then sector i ∈ [0, iˆ] are the sectors that maximize the complainant’s domestic
political gain of retaliation given the authorized level T .10
Alternatively, the complainant country may, within his retaliation capacity, select the retaliation list
that maximizes the negative political impact on the defendant government. To facilitate exposition, let R
denote the set of sectors i such that i ∈ [0, i0], and N the set of sectors i such that i ∈ [i0, n]. Re-order the
sectors in R so that for j ∈ [0, i0], hj = (4Π
d
j + a
d4W dj )/Tj increases with j, where 4Π
d
j = Π
d
j,r − Π
d
j,q
and 4W dj = W
d
j,r −W
d
j,q. For notational convenience, also re-index the sectors in N so that for j ∈ [i0, n],
j = i. In sectors where the complainant does not import from the defendant, retaliation in terms of import
restrictions is not possible. Therefore, in these sectors, Πdj,r = Π
d
j,q, W
d
j,r = W
d
j,q, and hj = 0. As argued
earlier, retaliation will render the defendant government worse off than in the status quo. It follows that
hj ≤ 0 for all j, and hj < 0 for j ∈ [0, i0]. Finally, define jˆ such that
∫ jˆ
0
Tj dj = T .
Definition 2 The politically optimal retaliation list RB(T ), which maximizes the defendant government’s
political loss from the retaliation given the complainant’s retaliation capacity and the WTO-authorized level
T , is the set of industries j such that j ∈ [0,min(i0, jˆ)].
Given the definition of RA(T ) and RB(T ), it is straightforward to see that for the complainant
GcrA ≡
∫
i∈RA(T )
(Πci,r + a
cW ci,r) di+
∫
i/∈RA(T )
(Πci,q + a
cW ci,q) di
≥
∫
j∈RB(T )
(Πcj,r + a
cW cj,r) dj +
∫
j /∈RB(T )
(Πcj,q + a
cW cj,q) dj ≡ G
c
rB ≥ G
c
q, (6)
and for the defendant
Gdq ≥ G
d
rA ≡
∫
i∈RA(T )
(Πdi,r + a
dW di,r) di+
∫
i/∈RA(T )
(Πdi,q + a
dW di,q) di
≥
∫
j∈RB(T )
(Πdj,r + a
dW dj,r) dj +
∫
j /∈RB(T )
(Πdj,q + a
dW dj,q) dj ≡ G
d
rB . (7)
Therefore, between retaliation proposals RA(T ) and RB(T ), both parties prefer the former to the latter.
10See Evenett (2002) for an empirical study on the potential retaliation capacity of major trading countries.
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There is no reason for the complainant to propose RB(T ) unless it can induce a better outcome for the
complainant than to propose RA(T ). This point will become clear in Section 5.
4. THE SETTLEMENT POSSIBILITIES
Although the DSU states preference for full compliance with the panel/appellate body’s recommendations
within the determined reasonable period of time, it also allows the disputing parties to work out some
compensation schemes as temporary solutions if immediate full compliance by the defendant government is
not feasible. Compensation is supposed to be carried out through additional openness of the defendant’s
domestic market in some sectors and at a magnitude agreeable to both parties. However, in practice,
a dispute can also be resolved at this stage through other alternative mutually agreed solutions. They
may take the form of (i) partial removal of the contentious policy and (ii) restructuring of the original
contentious policy to some kind of rent-sharing agreement, as pointed out in Bown (2002). I will pool all
these intermediate enforcement outcomes in one category and label it “settlement.” This category includes
compensation schemes and other forms of mutually agreeable solutions. One task that might pose challenges
to both disputing parties is to identify the set of settlement possibilities, and to locate the Pareto optimal
ones among the available options. I investigate this issue below.
Before investigating the settlement possibilities, it is necessary to identify the ranking of the payoffs of
compliance and the status quo for both parties, as these set the background for meaningful negotiations.
Relative to the status quo, compliance by the defendant through removal of the contentious policy will
raise the international price and domestic prices of other countries in the affected industries. This makes the
complainant’s interest groups in the affected sectors better off, but has a possibly positive or negative effect on
the complainant’s aggregate welfare. The latter effect depends on whether the complainant is an exporter or
importer of the goods and on the complainant’s original trade policy in these sectors.11 However, I will argue
that compliance by the defendant must render the complainant government politically better off in terms of
its political objective: Gc =
∑n
i=1Π
c
i+a
c
∑n
i=1W
c
i , since otherwise, the government would not have filed the
dispute in the first place. Therefore, Gcl =
∑n
i=1Π
c
i,l+a
cW ci,l > G
c
q =
∑n
i=1Π
c
i,q+a
c
∑n
i=1W
c
i,q. On the other
hand, the defendant’s compliance will hurt its local interest groups in the affected sectors, but will have a
possibly positive or negative effect on its aggregate welfare, depending on the affected sectors’ original trade
structure and policies. Nevertheless, the fact that the defendant government adopted the contentious policy in
the first place implies that revoking the policy, so as to conform to the WTO ruling, will render the defendant
government politically worse off. Therefore, Gdl =
∑n
i=1Π
d
i,l + a
dW di,l < G
d
q =
∑n
i=1Π
d
i,q + a
d
∑n
i=1W
d
i,q.
11See equations (4) and (5).
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The ranking of the two outcomes for the two disputing parties is illustrated in Figure 1, where the political
welfare of the defendant government Gd =
∑n
i=1Π
d
i + a
d
∑n
i=1W
d
i is indicated on the horizontal axis, and
the political welfare of the complainant government Gc =
∑n
i=1Π
c
i + a
c
∑n
i=1W
c
i on the vertical axis. The
point representing the compliance outcome (L) thus lies above and to the left of the point representing the
status quo (Q).
Given the basic ranking of compliance and the status quo, I now explore possible settlement schemes.
First of all, whatever the settlement arrangements might be, they should not render the complainant worse
off than the status quo, for such arrangements can not be agreeable to the complainant. Therefore, it must
be the case that Gcs ≥ G
c
q. By the same token, any potential settlement arrangements can not render the
defendant worse off than simply complying with the ruling and removing the policy. This implies that
Gds ≥ G
d
l .
Next, it is straightforward to see that if a settlement specifies a less than full removal of the original
contentious policy, it will render the complainant not as well off as in the case of full compliance. A
more interesting question is that whether it is possible that some compensation scheme might make the
complainant better off than the defendant’s full compliance. Would the complainant rather see some other
sectors of the defendant’s liberalized and allow the defendant to keep the contentious policy in place? I will
argue that this is not likely. If the defendant offers a compensation scheme which allows him to keep the
contentious policy violating previous commitment but at the same time adjusts downward trade restrictions
in other sectors as rewards to the complainant, and this compensation scheme also makes the complainant
government better off than the defendant’s compliance, then this alternative scheme of trade policies should
have been negotiated successfully between the two parties through the WTO safeguard clause. The fact that
the complainant is challenging the defendant’s contentious policy indicates that no such mutually beneficial
compensation scheme, compared to the defendant’s full compliance, is available. Therefore, I postulate that
any compensation scheme that the defendant is willing to propose (i.e. which renders himself no worse off
than complying) can not make the complainant better off than the state of compliance. It follows that
Gcs ≤ G
c
l .
On the other hand, for the defendant, any partial compliance will render himself worse off than in the
status quo, if full compliance does, which was argued to be true earlier in this section. Likewise, any
compensation scheme where the defendant concedes at some other import sectors by reducing restrictions,
will also render the defendant worse off than in the status quo. The argument is similar to that given
earlier for Gdl < G
d
q . The fact that some trade restrictions exist in these scapegoat sectors implies that the
political clout (Πdi + a
dW di ) is maximized at the existing tariff/subsidy level in these sectors. Any cutback
of tariffs/subsidies in these sectors implies a loss for the defendant government, relative to the status quo.
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Therefore, it must be the case that Gds ≤ G
d
q . Overall, therefore, the settlement possibilities are restricted
to the rectangular area between “compliance” and the “status quo” as shown in Figure 1.
The set of settlement possibilities can be further pinpointed. First of all, all of the settlement schemes
that involve partial compliance will yield payoffs that are weighted averages of the two polar outcomes,
“compliance” and the “status quo”. This is represented by the line segment LQ in Figure 1. Furthermore,
as argued earlier, all potential compensation schemes will yield payoffs that lie within the rectangular box.
To illustrate, assume for now that the parties can identify four such compensation schemes, whose payoffs are
indicated respectively by S1, S2, S3, and S4. Then all convex combinations of the four compensation schemes
and the two polar outcomes (compliance and the status quo) are also possible settlement arrangements. It
is straightforward to see that the compensation scheme S4 is inferior to a proper partial compliance scheme
such as P , and the compensation scheme S3 is inferior to some weighted average of the two other schemes
S1 and S2. Given the identified compensation options, the Pareto-optimal settlement possibilities frontier,
which yields the highest payoff for one party given the payoff attained by another party, is the line segment
connecting the four points L, S1, S2, and Q. The argument above can be generalized to other scenarios with
different compensation options available to the two parties. The dashed curve LS1S2Q represents a limiting
scenario where parties can identify a continuous stream of compensation possibilities. On the other hand, it
is possible that in some case, there exist no feasible compensation schemes that lie to the northeast of LQ.
In this case, the settlement possibilities frontier reduces to the simple line segment LQ.
5. EQUILIBRIUM OUTCOMES
The sequence of interactions between the disputing parties at the enforcement stage of the WTO dispute
settlement procedure can be illustrated with the game tree in Figure 2. To simplify the analysis, I assume
that the continuous flow payoffs attached to the final equilibrium outcome are countries’ major concerns and
that the transition payoffs during the process can be safely ignored.
If the panel/appellate body’s final decision finds the contentious policy to be inconsistent with the
WTO agreement, the defendant government has up to a reasonable period of time, usually determined by
arbitration, to implement the panel/appellate body’s recommendations and comply with the rulings. If the
defendant fails to do so, the defendant is recommended to enter into negotiations with the complainant with
a view to reach a mutually acceptable compensation within 20 days following the expiry of the reasonable
period of time. If no compensation schemes can be agreed between the parties within the time period, the
complainant may request authorization from the WTO to retaliate against the defendant (DSU 22.2). Thus
in Figure 2, the defendant at the first decision node is characterized as choosing between two alternative
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actions, to “comply” or to “take no action” within the reasonable period of time, and at the second decision
node following the expiry of the period, to propose to “settle” with the complainant or still to “take no
action” and wait for the complainant’s response. The dispute ends with the WTO’s preferred outcome, if
the defendant complies. The payoff for the two governments in this scenario is (Gdl , G
c
l ).
If the defendant fails to take any action, the complainant may request authorization from the WTO
to retaliate at a proposed level, which is subject to the defendant’s challenge and arbitrators’ modification
(DSU 22.6 and 22.7). Once the level of retaliation equivalent to nullification or impairment is determined by
arbitration, the complainant has the discretion to select sectors to carry out retaliation. Although the DSU
sets out certain rules in the sector-selection process (DSU 22.3), the restriction is minimal. For example, the
rule says that retaliation should be carried out in the same “sector” where the violation or other nullification
or impairment is found. The “sector” in the DSU carries a different meaning from the usual economic
definition. With respect to goods trade, all goods are considered by the DSU as in the same sector.12 As a
result, in our current context, where goods trade is the main concern, the rule virtually imposes no restriction
on the complainant’s choice of sectors for retaliation. As discussed in Section 3, given his retaliation capacity,
the complainant has two potential strategies in setting the retaliation list: one to maximize his domestic
political gain and the other to maximize the negative political impact on the defendant. Therefore in Figure
2, following the defendant’s failure to take any action, the complainant’s strategy is indicated as choosing
among “retaliation list A”, “retaliation list B”, or “taking no action.” The dispute ends with the status quo
if the complainant does not take any retaliatory action. The payoff for the two governments is (Gdq , G
c
q).
Following the complainant’s proposal of either retaliation list, the defendant may decide whether to
“comply”, to “settle”, or still to “take no action”. The dispute ends if the defendant complies, with a payoff
of (Gdl , G
c
l ). On the other hand, if the defendant does not take any action in response to the complainant’s
retaliation threat, the complainant may then decide whether or not to carry out the retaliation as proposed.
The payoff for the two governments is (GdrA, G
c
rA) if the retaliation list A is carried out, is (G
d
rB , G
c
rB) if the
retaliation list B is carried out, and is (Gdq , G
c
q) if the complainant does not carry out the retaliation. Finally,
if the defendant proposes to settle following the complainant’s threat of retaliation, the complainant then
has the option to accept, with a payoff of (Gds , G
c
s), or to reject the proposal. If the complainant rejects the
proposal, the defendant then decides whether or not to comply. If he complies, the payoff (Gdl , G
c
l ) accrues
to the governments; if not, the complainant then either carries out the retaliation as proposed earlier, with
a payoff of (GdrA, G
c
rA) in the case of proposal A, and a payoff of (G
d
rB , G
c
rB) in the case of proposal B, or
takes no action with the status quo payoff (Gdq , G
c
q) maintained.
Alternatively, the defendant may propose to settle in the very beginning, which the complainant may
12Service trade and intellectual property rights, on the other hand, have more detailed sector classifications.
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accept, with a payoff of (Gds , G
c
s), or reject. If no settlement is accomplished, the defendant then decides
whether to comply or not. In the first case, the payoff (Gdl , G
c
l ) applies. In the second case, the complainant
may propose to retaliate. The subsequent subgame is the same as the one discussed earlier that follows the
defendant’s inaction after the expiry of the reasonable period of time.
In what follows, I characterize the equilibrium outcome that will emerge under alternative conditions.
The analysis is presented in a concise, intuitive way, but can be verified in a rigorous manner, by applying
backward induction to the game tree as described in Figure 2.
5.1 The Enforcement Failure Scenario - Status Quo
If the complainant imports nothing from the defendant, or for all the sectors where the complainant imports
from the defendant, retaliation renders the complainant government worse off – the loss in general welfare
from retaliation dominates the gain in profits, then the complainant has no retaliation capacity (gi ≤ 0 for
all i), and the status quo will remain.
To see this, note that when the complainant does not have retaliation capacity (gi ≤ 0 for all i), the
politically optimal retaliation lists RA(T ) and RB(T ) are both empty (i0 = 0). Therefore, the political welfare
of the parties under either retaliation proposal is identical to the status quo. This scenario is indicated in
Figure 3, where the point specifying the political welfare of the parties when the complainant follows the
retaliation list RA(T ) or RB(T ) coincides with the point representing the status quo. In this case, if the
defendant fails to comply or reach a settlement with the complainant, it is not credible for the complainant
to carry out retaliation. Knowing this, the defendant will then choose to take no action. As a result, the
status quo remains.
Proposition 1 (Status Quo) The enforcement failure outcome arises if the complainant has no retaliation
capacity (i0 = 0, i.e. G
c
rA = G
c
rB = G
c
q). In this case, the defendant’s illegal trade policy remains and the
complainant does not retaliate. The political welfare of the disputing governments is (Gdq , G
c
q).
This enforcement failure problem, prone to happen when country sizes differ a lot and when trade
flows among countries are very asymmetric, is inherent in the current WTO enforcement mechanism where
enforcement is carried out on a bilateral basis. Although this scenario does not occur very often in practice as
shown in Table 1, it might be the case that the affected small countries simply do not attempt to bring such
disputes to the WTO, anticipating the lack of enforcement power. The WTO has attempted to remedy this
asymmetric enforcement power problem by authorizing, in the Banana case, the small complainant country,
Ecuador, to retaliate with respect to obligations under the TRIPS agreements, beyond the conventional
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enforcement instrument of 100% tariffs on goods trade. This extra enforcement power worked to propel the
EU to reach a settlement deal with Ecuador.
5.2 The Partial Enforcement Scenario - Settlement
As discussed in Section 3, when the complainant becomes more powerful such that he has some retaliation
capacity (i0 > 0), imposing retaliation according to R
A(T ) or RB(T ) will render the complainant government
politically better off and the defendant government worse off than the status quo. In addition, the political
payoffs for both parties, when the complainant carries out the alternative retaliation list RB(T ), will be
lower than those of RA(T ). This is indicated in Figure 4, where the point corresponding to the retaliation
list RB(T ) lies to the southwest of the point corresponding to the retaliation list RA(T ) and both points are
located to the northwest of the point representing the status quo.
Suppose that the settlement possibilities frontier identified by the parties to the dispute is the dotted
curve connecting the two polar scenarios, “compliance” and “status quo,” in Figure 4. In this scenario,
both RA(T ) and RB(T ) are credible retaliation proposals. If the complainant publishes retaliation proposal
RB(T ) and the defendant does not comply or offer to settle, it is credible for the complainant to carry out
RB(T ), as it renders him better off than the status quo. Given that the biggest harm the complainant
can inflict on the defendant with RB(T ) is smaller than if the defendant complies, the defendant will not
comply. However, the defendant can improve on RB(T ) by offering to settle along the curve s1s4, which
the complainant will accept. Similarly, if the complainant publishes retaliation proposal RA(T ), settlement
along the curve s2s3 is optimal for both. However, since the complainant can choose between R
A(T ) and
RB(T ), it will not take settlement offer that is less than his payoff at RA(T ). Therefore, the settlement
offer has to lie somewhere along the curve s1s3. On the other hand, the defendant has no incentive to offer
any settlement along the curve s1s2, as any offer along s2s3 will be accepted by the complainant regardless
of whether RA(T ) or RB(T ) is threatened to be used. Therefore, the equilibrium outcome is some form of
settlement along the curve s2s3.
Proposition 2 (Settlement) The partial enforcement outcome arises, and the disputing parties settle
through some compensation scheme or through the defendant’s partial removal of the WTO-illegal trade
policy, if GcrB > G
c
q, G
d
rB > G
d
l , and there exists a settlement arrangement (G
d
s , G
c
s) such that G
d
s > G
d
rA
and Gcs > G
c
rA. In this case, the political welfare of the disputing governments is (G
d
s , G
c
s).
In this scenario, the defendant’s political loss from his import sectors in the compensation scheme is
smaller than that from his export sectors under retaliation RA(T ). On the other hand, the complainant’s
political benefit from his export sectors in the compensation scheme is larger than that from his import
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sectors under retaliation RA(T ). This mutual improvement in the political payoff for both governments
compared to retaliation allows the possibility of settlement. Although such arrangements fall short of full
compliance, the complainant is compensated partially in terms of his political welfare. As indicated in
Table 1, a small proportion of WTO violations are resolved in this manner.
5.3 The Political Escape Scenario - Retaliation
In this scenario, the worst damage the complainant can inflict upon the defendant through imposing RB(T )
is still not enough to induce compliance as in previous scenarios. However, settlement between the parties
now becomes impossible, and the defendant would rather let retaliation taking place than to settle. Figure 5
illustrates three representative cases.
In all of the three cases, the defendant will not comply even if the complainant threatens to retaliate
with RB(T ). In case (1), the defendant can potentially settle with the complainant along the curve s1s2
indicated in the figure, which will make himself better off than if retaliated with RB(T ) and at the same
time make the complainant better off than retaliating with RA(T ). However, comparing the payoffs under
possible settlements along s1s2 and under R
A(T ), the defendant is in fact better off under RA(T ). Therefore,
the defendant will take no action under retaliation proposal RA(T ) and will offer to settle along s2s3 under
retaliation proposal RB(T ), and in response, the complainant will choose to retaliate according to RA(T ).
In case (2), the defendant can not find any settlement that will improve upon the state of RB(T ) for
himself and at the same time make the complainant better off than under RA(T ). Therefore, settlement is not
possible and the complainant will retaliate according to RA(T ) at the equilibrium. In case (3), under either
retaliation proposals, no settlement is possible and retaliation is inevitable. However, since RA(T ) renders
the complainant higher payoff than RB(T ), the complainant will carry out the former at the equilibrium. In
all cases, therefore, if retaliation is indeed carried out, the complainant government will adopt the retaliation
list RA(T ), which maximizes its domestic political gain.
Proposition 3 (Retaliation) The defendant will maintain the WTO-illegal trade policy, and in response,
the complainant will retaliate, if GcrB > G
c
q, G
d
rB > G
d
l , and there exists no settlement arrangement (G
d
s , G
c
s)
such that Gds > G
d
rA and G
c
s > G
c
rA. In this case, the complainant government will retaliate according to the
list RA(T ), which maximizes its domestic political gain. The political welfare of the disputing governments
is (GdrA, G
c
rA).
In this scenario, the political cost to the defendant government if he complies is much larger than any
potential harm the complainant’s retaliation can inflict on his export sectors. Furthermore, there exist no
mutually beneficial settlement arrangements, which will make him better off than under retaliation and at
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the same time be acceptable to the complainant. As a result, retaliation emerges as the equilibrium outcome.
As can be seen from Table 1, there have been six cases where retaliation is authorized. However, some of
these authorizations of retaliation have prompted settlement between the parties or compliance from the
defendant. Only in one case, the Hormone case against the EU, has the retaliation been carried out and
remained so far. In spite of the negative opinions some WTO observers expressed toward the use of retaliation
and the non-compliance of the defendant, the fact that the defendant is willing to accept retaliation without
further counter-retaliation speaks volumes for the political difficulty that the defendant as a democratic
government will face domestically to comply with the ruling. In this sense, the retaliation outcome can be
viewed as a political escape from the WTO system, if compliance indeed will result in great political cost
for the defendant government.13
5.4 The Full Enforcement Scenario - Compliance
If it is credible for the complainant to carry out the retaliation proposal RB(T ) and the defendant is worse off
under the retaliation proposal RB(T ) than under compliance, then compliance will emerge as the equilibrium
outcome. Figure 6 illustrates this scenario. In case (1), note that if the defendant does not comply or settle,
it is credible for the complainant to carry out RB(T ) as retaliation renders him better off than the status quo.
The defendant will comply if RB(T ) is proposed by the complainant. On the other hand, under proposal
RA(T ), the two parties will settle along the solid curve ss indicated in the figure. Since the complainant
is better off proposing RB(T ), which induces compliance, than proposing RA(T ), which induces settlement
offers less than full compliance, he will propose RB(T ). Therefore, the equilibrium outcome is “compliance.”
In case (2), the complainant can induce the defendant to comply using either proposal RA(T ) or RB(T ),
and there is no feasible settlement that will make both parties better off than the defendant’s compliance.
Therefore, the desired enforcement outcome of the WTO procedure successfully emerges in the equilibrium.
Proposition 4 (Compliance) The defendant will comply with the WTO ruling and remove the illegal
trade policy, if GcrB > G
c
q and G
d
rB < G
d
l . In this case, the political welfare of the disputing governments is
(Gdl , G
c
l ).
In this scenario, the defendant government’s political loss from his export sectors that will be affected
by the complainant’s retaliatory tariffs is larger than the political gain from his domestic sectors that have
benefited from the existing illegal trade policy. Therefore, the defendant government will choose to comply.
From Table 1, we see that most of the violations are resolved successfully through the defendant’s withdrawal
13See Charnovitz (2001, pp. 820) for a similar opinion.
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of the contentious policy. In general, the larger is the complainant’s retaliation capacity and the stronger
politically are the defendant’s export sectors, the more likely is the compliance outcome.
6. CONCLUSION
This paper analyzes the strategic interactions of disputing governments at the WTO enforcement stage,
following a violation ruling against the defendant. The disputing parties are portrayed as democratic gov-
ernments which face domestic political constraints, as well as the rules of enforcement laid down by the
WTO dispute procedure. They are mindful of the impacts of various enforcement outcomes on industry
interests as well as on aggregate welfare, and choose strategies that best serve their political interests. The
paper first examines the complainant’s retaliation capacity and strategy in formulating the retaliation list,
and then explores the scope of settlement possibilities between the parties. The results of the paper provide
a synopsis of the disputing governments’ political payoffs under alternative enforcement scenarios and the
conditions that determine the outcome of the implementation.
In particular, the compliance outcome will arise if the defendant government’s political loss from his
export sectors that will be affected by the complainant’s retaliatory tariffs is larger than the political gain
from his domestic sectors that have benefited from the existing illegal trade policy. Thus, the complainant
government will choose the retaliation list with sectors that maximizes the negative political impact on the
defendant government, subject to his retaliation capacity and the level authorized by the WTO. If compliance
is not foreseeable with the threat of this list, however, the complainant government will instead target the
sectors that maximize his domestic political gain, through granting new protection to the selected industries.
The retaliation outcome may be avoided if the disputing parties can identify compensation arrangements
that are mutually beneficial compared to the retaliation outcome. In this case, the defendant government’s
political loss from his import sectors in the compensation scheme is smaller than that from his export sectors
under retaliation. On the other hand, the complainant government’s political benefit from his export sectors
in the compensation scheme is larger than that from his import sectors under retaliation. This mutual
improvement in the political payoffs for both governments compared to retaliation allows the possibility
of settlement. Finally, the WTO enforcement mechanism will fail if the complainant has no retaliation
capacity. In this case, the complainant can not retaliate if the defendant does not comply or compensate,
and as a result, the status quo will remain. Overall, the enforcement outcome that emerges under the
WTO procedure reflects the calculations of domestic political interests by the disputing governments and
the tradeoffs of political benefits and costs between the disputing parties. The smaller is the complainant’s
retaliation capacity, the more biased is the outcome against the complainant.
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APPENDIX: THE ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL
STRUCTURES OF INDIVIDUAL COUNTRIES
This appendix establishes notation and summarizes the basic framework of Grossman and Helpman (1994,
1995a,b). The description is given for a representative country, with the country superscript suppressed for
now.
The country is populated withN individuals who have identical preferences u(c) = c0+
∑n
i=1 ui(ci), where
ci is the consumption of good i and ui(·) is an increasing and concave function. Good 0 is normalized to have
a price of one and is freely traded among countries. Given the utility function and the goods prices pi for
i = 1, . . . , n, an individual with income y demands Di(pi) of good i for i = 1, . . . , n and y −
∑n
i=1 piDi(pi)
of good 0. It follows that the individual’s indirect utility function is V (y, p) = y +
∑n
i=1 si(pi), where
p = (p1, . . . , pn) and si(pi) = ui(Di(pi)) − piDi(pi) is the consumer surplus derived from consumption of
good i for i = 1, . . . , n.
The production of good 0 uses only labor with a unit labor requirement equal to one. The production
of all other goods uses labor and a sector-specific factor with constant returns to scale. The labor force is
taken to be large enough that good 0 is always produced. Since good 0 is freely traded among countries
with a world price of one, the wage rate must equal one. Therefore, the owners of the specific factor used in
sector i receive profits of Πi(pi), which increases with pi. The supply of good i equals Xi(pi) = Π
′
i(pi) for
i = 1, . . . , n.
The ownership of sector-specific factors is assumed to be highly concentrated and constitutes only a
negligible fraction of the voting population N . The owners of the specific factor used in each sector have
a common interest in seeing a higher domestic price for their own sector. The common interest and small
number of specific-factor owners in each sector facilitate the formation of interest groups. The interest
groups compete noncooperatively with one another to induce favorable actions from the government that
will improve their group’s joint welfare. They do so by presenting the government a campaign contribution
schedule Ci(·), which is tied to the actions taken by the government (and possibly those of foreign governments
which the lobbies hope to influence through the local government). Since the interest groups constitute a
negligible fraction of the total population, they receive negligible amount of tariff revenue rebates and gain
a negligible fraction of consumer surplus. Therefore, the joint welfare of the interest group in sector i can
be approximated by Πi(pi)− Ci for i = 1, . . . , n.
The incumbent government values the campaign contributions as well as the general welfare, both of
which help to promote its likelihood of being re-elected. Its politically motivated objective function takes
the linear form G˜ =
∑n
i=1 Ci+aW , where W is aggregate welfare and a is the weight the government places
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on aggregate welfare relative to campaign contributions. The aggregate welfare includes total labor income,
total profits, total trade tax revenues net of subsidy expenditures, and aggregate consumer surplus. That is
W (p, p∗) = L+
n∑
i=1
Πi(pi) +
n∑
i=1
(pi − p
∗
i )Mi(pi) +Ns(p),
where p∗ = (p∗1, . . . , p
∗
n), p
∗
i is the equilibrium world price of good i given the trade policies of all countries,
and Mi = NDi(pi)−Xi(pi) is the net import demand for good i given pi. In the case of an export subsidy,
pi > p
∗
i and Mi < 0; on the other hand, an import tariff corresponds to pi > p
∗
i and Mi > 0. The trade tax
revenues net of subsidy expenditures are assumed to be rebated evenly to all individuals.
At the equilibrium, the contribution schedule of each interest group maximizes the joint welfare of its
members, given the contribution schedules set by other groups and the government’s optimization of its
political objective; and the action taken by the government maximizes its political objective function given
the contribution schedules offered by the interest groups. It is shown in Grossman and Helpman (1994) that
if the contribution schedules are globally truthful, i.e. the contribution schedules everywhere reflect the true
preferences of the lobbies, the government’s political objective function is equivalent to G =
∑n
i=1Πi+ aW .
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Table 1: The Outcomes of WTO Disputes as of 9/17/2003
Procedural Outcomea Enforcement Outcomeb
Total Complaints 301 Panel/Appellate Reports Adopted 88
withdrawn 24 no violationc 14
settled 41 violation 74
report adopted 88 complianced 43
in progress 148 mutually agreed solutione 9
authorization of retaliationf 6
outcome unknowng 8
in progressh 8
aThe statistics are compiled from WTO (2003).
bThe statistics are author’s tabulation based on the profiles of disputes provided in WTO (2003).
cThese are Disputes No. 22, 44, 60, 62, 67, 68, 135, 152, 163, 165, 194, 213, 221, 243.
dThese are Disputes No. 2, 4, 8, 10, 11, 18, 24, 31, 33, 50, 54, 55, 59, 63, 56, 58, 70, 75, 84, 76, 79, 87, 110, 90, 98, 114, 121,
138, 139, 142, 146, 175, 156, 161, 169, 170, 177, 178, 179, 189, 192, 202, 236.
eThese are Disputes No. 34, 99, 103, 113, 122, 126, 155, 160, 231.
fThese are Disputes No. 26, 48, 27, 46, 108, 222.
gThese include the disputes where their enforcement outcomes can not be inferred from the information provided by WTO
(2003) or other documents available on WTO web site. The disputes may be unresolved with the contentious policy still in
place, or they may have been resolved between disputing parties without being notified to or recorded by the WTO. They are
Disputes No. 69, 132, 136, 162, 141, 166, 206, 211.
hThese include the disputes where, as of 9/17/2003, the reasonable period of time to comply had not yet expired, and no
compliance or settlement had resulted. They are Disputes No. 176, 184, 207, 212, 217, 234, 238, 241.
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Figure 2: Game Tree of the WTO Enforcement Mechanism
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Figure 3: The Enforcement Failure Scenario - Status Quo
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Figure 4: The Partial Enforcement Scenario - Settlement
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Figure 5: The Political Escape Scenario - Retaliation
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Figure 6: The Full Enforcement Scenario - Compliance
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